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________________ 
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, with whom Chief Judge Smith and 
Judges McKee, Chagares, Greenaway, Jr., Shwartz, Restrepo, 
Bibas, and Porter join. 
The Federal Government is typically immune from 
suit.  The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the Government’s 
immunity for certain torts committed by its employees.  
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) does so for specific intentional torts 
committed by “investigative or law enforcement officers,” 
which it defines as “any officer of the United States who is 
empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or 
to make arrests for violations of Federal law.”  If a federal 
official fits this definition, plaintiffs may sue for certain 
intentional torts.  
Nadine Pellegrino relies on § 2680(h), which we also 
refer to as the “proviso,” to recover against Transportation 
Security Officers (TSOs) at the Philadelphia International 
Airport who allegedly detained her, damaged her property, 
and fabricated charges against her.  The District Court 
dismissed her case on the ground that TSOs are not 
“officer[s] of the United States” who “execute searches . . . 
for violations of Federal law.”  The underlying theme was 
that the subsection’s waiver of immunity covers only criminal 
law enforcement officers, and TSOs, though nominally 
officers, are nothing more than screeners who perform 
routine, administrative inspections of passengers and property 
on commercial aircraft. 
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We disagree.  The words of the proviso dictate the 
result here.  Because TSOs are “officer[s] of the United 
States” empowered to “execute searches” for “violations of 
Federal law,” Pellegrino’s lawsuit may proceed.   
Background 
A. Factual Background 
Pellegrino and her husband arrived at the Philadelphia 
International Airport to board a flight home to Florida.  This 
meant passing through the security checkpoint maintained by 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) with TSOs.  
Congress created the TSA after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, with the enactment of the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 
597 (2001).  Under that Act, TSOs perform screenings at 
TSA checkpoints in airports in the United States.  See 
49 U.S.C. § 44901(a). 
As Pellegrino passed through the security checkpoint, 
she was randomly selected for additional screening.  A TSO 
began examining her bags, but she stopped him and requested 
a more discreet screening.  In a private room, several TSOs 
combed through Pellegrino’s luggage, papers, and other 
effects.  One allegedly counted her coins and currency, 
examined her cell phone data, read the front and back of her 
membership and credit cards, and opened and smelled her 
cosmetics, mints, and hand sanitizer.  Per Pellegrino, the TSO 
also spilled the contents of several containers and was so 
rough with her belongings that her jewelry and eyeglasses 
were damaged.  Frustrated, she told the TSOs that she would 
report their conduct to a supervisor.  
The screening ended, but the TSOs’ alleged torment 
did not.  Pellegrino was left to clean up the mess created by 
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the search, a task that took several trips to and from the 
screening room.  As she was repacking her first bag, one of 
the TSOs claimed that Pellegrino struck her with it.  On a trip 
to retrieve another bag, another TSO allegedly blocked 
Pellegrino’s access to it, forcing her to crawl under a table to 
reach it.  When she did so, the table tipped over, and the TSO 
claimed Pellegrino struck her in the leg while she was 
collecting the bag.  Pellegrino denies striking either TSO and 
alleges she heard both say to one another, “[Y]ou saw her hit 
me, didn’t you?” 
As a result of the TSOs’ allegations, the Philadelphia 
District Attorney’s Office charged Pellegrino with ten crimes, 
including aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of a 
crime (her luggage), and making terroristic threats.  At a 
preliminary hearing, the presiding judge dismissed many of 
the charges and the District Attorney abandoned others.  The 
remaining charges came to naught when the TSA failed to 
produce surveillance video from the incident, one TSO failed 
to appear in court, and another TSO’s testimony was self-
contradictory on key points. 
B. Procedural History 
After her ordeal at the airport and victory in the 
courtroom, Pellegrino and her husband brought numerous 
constitutional and statutory claims (including under the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Freedom of 
Information Act) against the TSA and several TSOs.  The 
District Court winnowed them down to claims for property 
damage, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious 
prosecution under the Tort Claims Act and implied rights of 
action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971), for malicious prosecution in violation of the First 
and Fourth Amendments.  The claim for property damage 
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settled, and the Court granted summary judgment on the 
Bivens claims.   
As for the claims under the Tort Claims Act for false 
arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, the 
Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the 
ground that TSOs are not “investigative or law enforcement 
officer[s]” whose intentional torts expose the United States to 
liability.  See Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., No. 09-
cv-5505, 2014 WL 1489939, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2014).  
In particular, the Court stated that it was “ambiguous” 
whether TSOs perform the requisite “searches . . . for 
violations of Federal law,” id. at *5, and turned to the 
legislative history of the proviso at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) to 
rule in favor of the Government, id. at *6–7.   
On appeal we appointed amicus counsel to argue 
Pellegrino’s side on, inter alia, the Tort Claims Act issue.  A 
divided panel of our Court affirmed the District Court in full 
(including as to summary judgment on the non–Tort Claims 
Act claims).  See Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., 896 
F.3d 207, 209 (3d Cir. 2018).  We then granted rehearing en 
banc to consider whether TSOs are “investigative or law 
enforcement officer[s]” as defined in the Tort Claims Act. 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1346(b) and 1331.  We have jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, and we review anew the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Tort Claims Act.  See Baer v. United 
States, 722 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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Analysis 
As noted, the United States enjoys baseline immunity 
from suit.  See Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50, 51–52 
(2013).  Congress has overridden this rule with the Tort 
Claims Act’s general waiver of immunity for injuries “caused 
by . . . any employee of the Government.”  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b)(1).  The waiver of immunity does not extend to 
several circumstances noted in 28 U.S.C. § 2680, including 
the subsection pertinent here; hence the Government’s 
immunity is reclaimed as to eleven intentional torts laid out in 
the so-called intentional-tort exception at § 2680(h).  Those 
eleven are “assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, [and] interference with contract 
rights.”  Id. § 2680(h).   
But even the intentional-tort exception has its limits.  
Under the proviso, the exception does not apply to (and thus 
the United States may still be sued for) six of the eleven torts 
— “assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of 
process, [and] malicious prosecution” — committed by 
“investigative or law enforcement officers.”  Id.  “For the 
purpose of this subsection, ‘investigative or law enforcement 
officer’ means any officer of the United States who is 
empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or 
to make arrests for violations of Federal law.”  Id.  The 
question for us is whether TSOs fit this definition. 
A. Text of the Proviso, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) 
Are TSOs (1) “officer[s] of the United States” who are 
(2) “empowered by law” to (3) “execute searches” for (4) 
“violations of Federal law”?  To begin, we track the text. 
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1. “Any Officer of the United States . . .” 
“Ordinarily, a word’s usage accords with its dictionary 
definition.”  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 
(2015).  Under one prominent dictionary definition shortly 
before 1974, the year of the proviso’s enactment, an officer 
“serve[s] in a position of trust” or “authority,” especially as 
“provided for by law.”  Officer, Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1971); see also Officer, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (4th ed. rev. 1968) (“[A]n officer is one 
holding a position of trust and authority . . . .”).  TSOs satisfy 
this definition, as they are “tasked with assisting in a critical 
aspect of national security — securing our nation’s airports 
and air traffic.”  Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 
207 (3d Cir. 2017).  To take another definition from the time, 
officers are “charged” by the Government “with the power 
and duty of exercising certain functions . . . to be exercised 
for the public benefit.”  Officer, Black’s Law Dictionary, 
supra.  TSOs qualify under this definition as well, as they 
perform “the screening of all passengers and property,” 
49 U.S.C. § 44901(a), to protect travelers from hijackings, 
acts of terror, and other threats to public safety.  For good 
reason, the role is Transportation Security Officer, and TSOs 
wear uniforms with badges that prominently display the title 
“Officer.”1  Hence they are “officer[s]” under the proviso.  
                                              
1  The title “officer” was adopted by the TSA in 2005, 
with the uniforms and “officer” badges added in 2008.  See 
Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., Transportation Security 
Officers Have Renewed Focus and New Look on Seventh 
Anniversary of 9/11 (Sept. 11, 2008), 
https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2008/09/11/transportation-
security-officers-have-renewed-focus-and-new-look-seventh.  
Interestingly, a bill was introduced in 2011 that would have 
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If TSOs are officers by name, wear uniforms with 
badges noting that title, and serve in positions of trust and 
authority, what is the textual argument to rebut the 
straightforward conclusion that they are “officer[s] of the 
United States” under the proviso?  It would be that the 
Aviation Security Act creates the position of “law 
enforcement officer,” 49 U.S.C. § 114(p)(1), one who carries 
a firearm and can make arrests for criminal law violations, id. 
§ 114(p)(2), while designating TSOs as “employee[s],” id. 
§ 44901(a).  This latter provision of the Aviation Security Act 
borrows from the general civil-service statute for who is an 
“employee.”  That general provision is 5 U.S.C. § 2105, 
which in turn defines “employee” to include “officer[s]” in 
§ 2105(a).  “Officer” is further defined as an individual 
“appointed in the civil service by,” among others, “the head 
of an Executive agency.”  Id. § 2104(a)(1).  But TSOs are not 
appointed by the head of an Executive agency.  Rather, they 
are appointed by the TSA Administrator, formerly known as 
the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security.  See 
49 U.S.C. § 44935 (1994), amended by FAA Reauthorization 
Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186 (2018).  
This official leads the TSA, see 49 U.S.C. § 114(b), but is not 
the head of an Executive agency.  Thus TSOs technically are 
not “officers” under the Aviation Security Act.  
But are they “officer[s]” under the Tort Claims Act?  
A distinction between “employee[s]” and “officer[s]” appears 
                                                                                                     
stripped TSOs of the title “officer” and of the “officer” badge.  
See Stop TSA’s Reach In Policy Act, H.R. 3608, 112th Cong. 
(2011), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-
bill/3608/text (to be known, were it passed, as the STRIP 
Act).  It went nowhere.  Thus what we know is that Congress 
knew of the “officer” designation and decided to do nothing 
to counter it. 
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in that Act, which (as noted) waives sovereign immunity for 
the torts of an “employee,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), but 
applies § 2680(h)’s waiver only to “officer[s],” id. § 2680(h).  
Because TSOs fall on the “employee” side of the line in the 
Aviation Security Act, do they as well in the Tort Claims 
Act? 
We think not.2  Aside from the single shared word 
“officer,” there is no textual indication that only a specialized 
“law enforcement officer” in the Aviation Security Act, 
49 U.S.C. § 114(p), qualifies as an “officer of the United 
States” under the proviso in the Tort Claims Act. 
And neither Act’s statutory distinction between 
“officer[s]” and “employee[s]” is airtight.  Instead, both 
statutes include “officers” within the meaning of the term 
“employee.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (providing in the Tort 
Claims Act that “[e]mployee of the Government” includes 
“officers or employees of any federal agency”); 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44901(a) (providing in the Aviation Security Act that 
“employee” is defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2105, which in turn 
defines “employee” to include “officer”).  We are hesitant to 
put too much stock into a distinction between two terms that 
are not themselves mutually exclusive.  See also 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44922(e) (providing that “[a] State or local law enforcement 
officer who is deputized” into federal service by the TSA 
Administrator “shall be treated as an ‘employee of the 
Government’” for purposes of the proviso) (emphases added). 
                                              
2  One Circuit has answered yes, see Corbett v. Transp. 
Sec. Admin., 568 F. App’x 690, 701 (11th Cir. 2014) (per 
curiam), but it did so in an unpublished, per curiam opinion 
that is not binding in that Circuit, see 11th Cir. R. 36-2, 
I.O.P. 7. 
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Moreover, grafting the Aviation Security Act’s 
definitions of “employee” and “officer” onto the Tort Claims 
Act yields a result inconsistent with case law, which includes 
non-officers in the general civil-service laws as “investigative 
or law enforcement officers” under the Tort Claims Act’s 
proviso.  See, e.g., Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 
1234 (2d Cir. 1982) (immigration agents); Moore v. United 
States, 213 F.3d 705, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (postal inspectors).  
Because the definitions of “officer” and “employee” in 
5 U.S.C. §§ 2104 and 2105 are underinclusive as applied to 
the proviso, we are reluctant to depend on them for our 
reading of “officer of the United States.”  See also Jack Boger 
et al., The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts 
Amendment: An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L. Rev. 497, 
519 & n.103 (1976) (arguing that the limitation to “any 
officer of the United States” in the newly enacted proviso was 
“apparently” not meant to import the “[w]ell-established . . . 
statutory . . . distinction[]” between “officers” and 
“employees” from 5 U.S.C. § 2104).  
Even if there were uncertainty about the reach of the 
term “officer of the United States,” it would be resolved in 
favor of a broad scope.  To begin, disputes over the breadth of 
the Tort Claims Act “do[] not implicate the general rule that 
‘a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be 
strictly construed . . . in favor of the sovereign.’”  Dolan v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 491 (2006) (quoting Lane v. 
Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)).  And here the statutory 
reference to “any officer” — as opposed to, say, criminal 
officer — supports an expansive reading.  See Boyle v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (“The term ‘any’ ensures 
that the definition has a wide reach[.]” (citation omitted)).  
Furthermore, as recently as 2013 the Supreme Court clamped 
down on a cramped reading of the proviso.  See Millbrook, 
569 U.S. at 56–57.  As the Fifth Circuit recently put it, “[t]he 
[Millbrook] Court held there to be no implicit limits on the 
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statutory language.”  Campos v. United States, 888 F.3d 724, 
737 (5th Cir. 2018).  If we follow suit, then no limiting words 
— like “criminal” or “traditional” before “officer” — should 
be added to the proviso. 
The Supreme Court’s expansive reading also set the 
tone for the Seventh Circuit’s sweeping view of the proviso 
last year.  See Bunch v. United States, 880 F.3d 938, 945 (7th 
Cir. 2018) (Wood, C.J.) (concluding that an ATF chemist 
could qualify under the proviso, and explaining that “[w]e are 
also influenced by the broad reading of the law-enforcement 
proviso that the Court adopted in Millbrook”).  Our decision 
today that TSOs are “officer[s] of the United States” is 
consistent with the broad constructions announced in 
Millbrook and Bunch. 
2.  “ . . . Empowered by Law . . .” 
To repeat, the complete proviso definition for an 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” is “any officer of 
the United States who is empowered by law to execute 
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations 
of Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  By its plain terms, the 
phrase “empowered by law” narrows the scope of “officer[s]” 
covered from the set of all “officer[s] of the United States” to 
the subset of those with the authority to, among other things, 
“execute searches.” 
Turning, then, to the statutory authority of TSOs, they 
are empowered by law to conduct “the screening of all 
passengers and property.”  49 U.S.C. § 44901(a).  Screening, 
in turn, is defined in part as a “physical examination,” 
including a “physical search.”  Id. § 44901(g)(4) (regarding 
screening of luggage).  Hence TSOs are “empowered by law” 
within the meaning of the proviso. 
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3. “ . . . To Execute Searches . . .” 
TSO screenings are “searches” (i) as a matter of 
ordinary meaning, (ii) under the Fourth Amendment, and 
(iii) under the definition provided in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968).  Attempts to distinguish (iv) between administrative 
and criminal “searches” are divorced from the plain text, and 
any distinction, if one must be made, should account for 
(v) the fact that TSA searches extend to the general public 
and involve examinations of an individual’s physical person 
and her property. 
(i) Ordinary Meaning. — TSOs perform “searches” as 
understood in ordinary parlance.  Of the many dictionary 
definitions that bear this out, to search is “to examine (a 
person) thoroughly to check on whatever articles are carried 
or concealed.”  Search, Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (1971); see also Search, Black’s Law Dictionary 
(4th ed. rev. 1968) (“an examination or inspection . . . with [a] 
view to discovery of stolen, contraband, or illicit property”).  
Dictionaries aside, one could simply ask any passenger at any 
airport.  Indeed, the very TSOs who screened Pellegrino 
called their procedure a search:  “While [a TSO] was doing 
the searches, [Pellegrino] continued to be verbally abusive.  
When the search was complete, the passenger asked that she 
repack her own bags . . . .”  J.A. 215 (incident report).   
The Aviation Security Act’s statutory and regulatory 
regime reflects this ordinary usage.  TSOs perform 
“screening[s] of all passengers and property,” 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44901(a), which include “physical search[es],” id. 
§ 44901(g)(4) (screening of luggage).  Likewise, TSA 
regulations provide that airlines “must refuse to transport . . . 
[a]ny individual who does not consent to a search or 
inspection of his or her person” and “[a]ny property of any 
individual or other person who does not consent to a search 
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or inspection of that property.”  49 C.F.R. § 1544.201(c) 
(emphases added); see also id. § 1540.107(a) (“No individual 
may enter a sterile area or board an aircraft without 
submitting to the screening and inspection of his or her 
person and accessible property in accordance with the 
procedures being applied to control access to that area or 
aircraft under this subchapter.”). 
(ii) Fourth Amendment. — Setting aside the ordinary 
meaning of “search,” airport screenings are searches as well 
under the Fourth Amendment.  George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 
562, 577 (3d Cir. 2013).  No warrant is required, and no 
individualized suspicion need exist.  Id.; see also Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 
(1989) (noting “the Federal Government’s practice of 
requiring the search of all passengers seeking to board 
commercial airliners, as well as the search of their carry-on 
luggage, without any basis for suspecting any particular 
passenger of an untoward motive”) (emphases added). 
The Government does not dispute that holding.  
Instead, it contends that consent by passengers cancels the 
Fourth Amendment’s effect.  But the presence or absence of 
consent does not determine whether a search has occurred for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  See George, 738 F.3d at 
575 (“The constitutionality of an airport screening search . . . 
does not depend on consent . . . . [A]ll that is required is the 
passenger’s election to attempt entry into the secured area.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc))).  In any 
event, TSO screenings are not consensual.  As noted, per TSA 
regulations any individual who does not consent to a “search 
or inspection” may not board a flight.  49 C.F.R. 
§ 1544.201(c); see also id. § 1540.107(a). 
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(iii) Meaning under Terry. — TSA screenings even 
meet the definition of the particular subset of Fourth 
Amendment searches announced in Terry just six years 
before the enactment of the proviso.  “[W]hen Congress 
employs a term of art, it . . . knows and adopts the cluster of 
ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of 
learning from which it was taken . . . .”  FAA v. Cooper, 566 
U.S. 284, 292 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Terry provided a vivid definition of “search”:  “[I]t is 
nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to 
suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a 
person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to 
find weapons is not a ‘search.’”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 
(emphasis added).  This is an apt description of the duties of a 
TSO, who by statute may “thoroughly conduct” an 
exploration “over an individual’s entire body.”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 44935(f)(1)(B)(v).  The TSA’s website elaborates that 
TSOs inspect “sensitive areas such as breasts, groin, and the 
buttocks” and must use “sufficient pressure to ensure 
detection.”  Transp. Sec. Admin., Security Screening, 
https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2019).  To deny that TSOs perform “searches” is to 
ignore Terry’s admonition against side-stepping the term’s 
obvious meaning. 
To be sure, Terry typically requires reasonable 
suspicion for a search.  But that is not the point here.  Under 
Terry, the existence of reasonable suspicion determines 
whether a search was justified, not whether it occurred in the 
first place.  An inspection may meet the definition of “search” 
under Terry yet involve no reasonable suspicion.  In that 
situation, the incident is still a search; it is simply an unlawful 
search. 
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(iv) Refuting a Distinction Between Criminal and 
Administrative Searches. — Some courts have perceived a 
distinction between two types of “searches”: those based on 
individualized suspicion performed by criminal law 
enforcement (no doubt covered by the proviso), and those, 
like health inspections, that further an administrative purpose 
(not covered).  See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 34 F. 
Supp. 3d 1168, 1180–81 (D. Colo. 2014). 
 The only textual support for this distinction comes 
from the interpretive canon noscitur a sociis (to know 
something by its accompanying words).  At three points in the 
proviso — “execute searches,” “seize evidence,” and “make 
arrests” — neighboring words arguably carry criminal 
connotations that possibly color the meaning of “searches.”  
In reverse order, “mak[ing] arrests” to curb federal law 
violations no doubt has a criminal color, and TSOs (unless 
specially designated, see 49 U.S.C. § 114(p)) do not make 
arrests.  They arguably seize evidence, but for our purposes 
they typically confiscate contraband in the pre-boarding 
process; thus we assume for the sake of argument that “seize 
evidence” also has a criminal connotation.  If both making 
arrests and seizing evidence have criminal functions, why 
doesn’t “execute searches”?  After all, Congress typically 
uses “execute” in the sense of “to execute a search warrant,” 
which is based on probable cause to believe that criminal 
activity exists.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (emphasis added).   
But Congress chose not to include the terms “warrant” 
or “search warrant” in § 2680(h).  For this reason, the Seventh 
Circuit recently rejected a reading of the proviso that would 
have limited “searches” to those based on warrants:  
“[S]ection 2680(h) does not require [the officer] to have had 
authority to seek and execute search warrants; it speaks only 
of executing searches, and many searches do not require 
warrants.”  Bunch, 880 F.3d at 945 (emphasis in original) 
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(citations omitted).  This removes the proviso from the ambit 
of exclusively criminal searches.  Nor does the verb 
“execute” automatically transform “searches” into 
specifically criminal searches; Congress uses milder verbs 
than “execute” even in the criminal context.  E.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000aa-11(a)(4) (discussing requirements “for a warrant to 
conduct a search”).  As a result, mere use of “execute” does 
not create a distinction between criminal searches and 
administrative searches. 
Moreover, we are doubly slow to apply the noscitur 
canon here.  Not only is the term “searches” clear, see Russell 
Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 520 (1923), 
but the three duties in the proviso are listed in the disjunctive 
(“to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests”).  
“When Congress has separated terms with the conjunction 
‘or,’” the canon often “is of little help.”  In re Continental 
Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 1991) (Scirica, J.) 
(citations omitted).  Each of the three duties independently 
suffices to define “investigative or law enforcement officer.”  
See Bunch, 880 F.3d at 943.  As even the counsel for the 
Government stated at oral argument, satisfying the proviso 
“would depend . . . on the individual statutory authority” 
measured against the three listed duties.  Tr. of En Banc Oral 
Arg. at 35:10–11.  We agree; the three statutory duties in the 
proviso begin and end the inquiry.  No resort to amorphous 
criminal connotations is warranted. 
No surprise, then, that every decision on the scope of 
the proviso tests whether any single duty is statutorily 
present.  Some federal officers qualify because they perform 
“searches.”  See Bunch, 880 F.3d at 943 (ATF chemists); cf. 
Caban, 671 F.2d at 1234 n.4 (immigration agents).  Others 
make arrests, and therefore qualify even if they don’t play a 
traditional law enforcement role.  See Campos, 888 F.3d at 
737 (Customs and Border Protection officers); Nurse v. 
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United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); 
Celestine v. United States, 841 F.2d 851, 853 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(per curiam) (Veterans’ Administration hospital security 
guards); Hernandez v. Lattimore, 612 F.2d 61, 64 n.7 (2d Cir. 
1979) (Bureau of Prisons officers); cf. Moore, 213 F.3d at 708 
(postal inspectors).  Only when officers lack all three duties 
are they outside the scope of the proviso.  See Wilson v. 
United States, 959 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) 
(parole officers); EEOC v. First National Bank of Jackson, 
614 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980) (Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission agent); Solomon v. United States, 
559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (security 
guard at military exchange).  These cases do not speak in 
terms of “criminal” or “non-criminal” functions.  Instead, 
they measure each job’s statutory duties against the three 
duties listed in the proviso.  Our reading does the same. 
Indeed, we could apply the same analysis to both 
TSOs and TSA “law enforcement officers” per 49 U.S.C. 
§ 114(p)(1).  Between the two groups, all three of the 
proviso’s listed duties are accounted for.  TSA law 
enforcement officers are authorized to (i) make arrests and 
(ii) seize evidence, see id. § 114(p)(2), while TSOs 
(iii) execute searches, see id. § 44901(a).  Taken together, the 
roles of both groups map onto the three-part, and disjunctive, 
definition set out in the proviso. 
Another conceivable way the noscitur canon might 
arrive at a distinction between criminal and administrative 
searches is by parsing the particular intentional torts against 
which the proviso waives immunity: assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious 
prosecution.  To be sure, these torts are commonly claimed 
against criminal law enforcement officers performing 
criminal law functions.  But as our case demonstrates, that 
these torts are typically brought against criminal law 
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enforcement officers does not mean that they are exclusively 
brought against them.   
Nor does a lack of training on the constitutional 
doctrines underpinning these torts absolve TSOs of liability.  
Congress knows how to define “law enforcement officers” by 
reference to training.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 248(q)(4) (“[T]he 
term ‘law enforcement officers’ means personnel who have 
successfully completed law enforcement training . . . .”).  
Here, by contrast, the proviso defines “investigative or law 
enforcement officer” not by reference to constitutional 
training, but by the legal authority to “execute searches.”  
Training has no bearing on whether TSOs are “investigative 
or law enforcement officers.”  For good reason, no court has 
ever relied on an officer’s lack of training to conclude that she 
was not an “investigative or law enforcement officer” under 
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
At bottom, Congress chose to re-waive sovereign 
immunity only for certain torts to cabin the Government’s 
liability, not to provide an indirect textual clue about the 
meaning of “investigative or law enforcement officer.”  See 
Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 764–65 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(“[B]y limiting the wrongs covered in the § 2680(h) exception 
. . . , Congress set finite boundaries around the kind of law 
enforcement abuses for which it wished to make the 
government liable.”). 
(v) Distinctions From Typical Administrative 
Searches. — If we must draw distinctions between “searches” 
in the proviso, the possible distinction between criminal and 
administrative searches is incomplete.  A further distinction 
within administrative searches may be needed — one that 
accounts for the physically intrusive and ubiquitous nature of 
TSA searches. 
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To begin, TSO screenings often involve invasive 
examinations of the physical person.  As even the panel 
majority in this case acknowledged, TSA searches are 
“rigorous and intimate for individuals.”  Pellegrino, 896 F.3d 
at 230.  This sets them apart from other administrative 
searches that involve only inspections of property or the 
environment.  E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 606(a) (providing for “an 
examination and inspection of all meat food products”); 
15 U.S.C. § 330c(a) (providing for “inspection of the books, 
records, and other writings” relating to weather modification). 
The intimate physical nature of TSA searches also 
harmonizes our decision today with Matsko v. United States, 
372 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2004), in which we held that an 
inspector of the Mine Safety and Health Administration, who 
had the “authority to inspect mines and investigate possible 
violations,” was not covered by the proviso.  Id. at 560 
(citation omitted).  Our Court also asserted in a dictum that 
“employees of administrative agencies, no matter what 
investigative conduct they are involved in, do not come 
within the § 2680(h) exception.”  Id.  Taken literally, this 
statement says too much; employees of “administrative 
agencies” such as the FBI, DEA, and ATF all are within the 
ambit of § 2680(h).  To the extent Matsko can be read to hold 
that mine safety inspectors are outside the proviso simply 
because they are administrative agency employees, it is no 
longer valid. 
Next, the risk of abuse is greater for TSO screenings 
than for most other administrative searches.  Because TSA 
searches affect the public directly, the potential for 
widespread harm is elevated.  This potential for abuse in 
borne out by Pellegrino’s own experience.  There is a reason 
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that FDA meat inspectors do not generate headlines about 
sexual assault and other intimate violations.3 
In sum, we hold only that TSO screenings are 
“searches” under the proviso because they are more personal 
than traditional administrative inspections — they extend to 
the general public and involve examinations, often intrusive, 
of an individual’s physical person along with her property. 
                                              
3  See, e.g., Rowaida Abdelaziz, Muslim Woman Says 
TSA Forced Her to Show Her Bloodied Pad During Airport 
Screening, Huffington Post (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/2LjzI7r; Lori Aratani, Watch the Video of TSA 
Officers Doing a Pat-Down of a 96-Year-Old Woman in a 
Wheelchair That Has People Outraged, Wash. Post (June 12, 
2018), https://wapo.st/2Om6SFi; Travis Andrews, ‘You 
Cannot Touch Me There,’: Breast Cancer Patient Claims TSA 
‘Humiliated’ and ‘Violated’ Her, Wash. Post (Dec. 8, 2016), 
http://wpo.st/ieQP2; Elizabeth Chuck, Father Outraged by 
‘Uncomfortable’ TSA Pat-Down on 10-Year-Old Daughter, 
NBC News (Jan. 6, 2016), http://nbcnews.to/1Ju6h0M; Ray 
Sanchez, New York TSA Worker Accused of Sexually Abusing 
Passenger, CNN (Aug. 29, 2015, 7:29 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/28/us/new-york-tsascreener-
charged/index.html; Omar Villafranca, TSA Agents Allegedly 
Strip-Search Woman, Fiddle with Feeding Tube, NBC News 
(July 19, 2012), http://bit.ly/2dk1VjL; Richard Esposito & 
Alicia Tejada, Now Three Grandmas Say They Were Strip-
Searched at JFK, ABC News (Dec. 6, 2011), 
http://abcn.ws/2dSDiJL. 
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4. “ . . . For Violations of Federal Law.” 
Under the proviso, investigative or law enforcement 
officers must be authorized “to execute searches, to seize 
evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (emphasis added).  To begin, the phrase 
“for violations of Federal law” may not even apply to the 
power to “execute searches.”  When interpreting a statute that 
includes “a list of terms or phrases followed by a limiting 
clause,” that clause “should ordinarily be read as modifying 
only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”  
Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 962 (2016) 
(citations omitted).  This is the so-called rule of the last 
antecedent, which the Supreme Court recently applied as 
follows:  Interpreting a statute listing “aggravated sexual 
abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a 
minor or ward,” the Court held that “the limiting phrase that 
appears at the end of that list — ‘involving a minor or ward’ 
— . . . modifies only ‘abusive sexual conduct,’ the antecedent 
immediately preceding it.”  Id. (construing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(b)(2)).  Applying that rule here, the phrase “for 
violations of Federal law” would modify only the last 
antecedent, “make arrests,” not “execute searches.” 
But we need not decide whether that rule applies here, 
as TSOs do execute searches “for violations of Federal law.”  
See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 46505 (providing criminal penalties for 
“[c]arrying a weapon or explosive on an aircraft”); 49 C.F.R. 
§§ 172.101, 175.10(a) (listing “hazardous materials” that are 
not permitted on flights).  The phrase “for violations of 
Federal law” sweeps notably broader than other statutes that 
specify violations of criminal law.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 115(c)(1) (defining “Federal law enforcement officer” by 
reference to “any violation of Federal criminal law”); 
5 U.S.C. § 8331(20) (defining “law enforcement officer” by 
reference to “offenses against the criminal laws of the United 
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States”).  To be sure, Congress could have said that an officer 
could “seize evidence” or “make arrests” only “for violations 
of Federal [criminal] law.”  But it didn’t.  And even if it did, 
TSOs search for weapons and explosives, and carrying them 
on board an aircraft is a criminal offense.  See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 
§ 46505; see also Enforcement Sanction Guidance Policy, 
Transp. Sec. Admin., 
https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_sanction_
guidance_policy.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2019) (noting that 
TSOs may refer offenders “for criminal investigation and 
enforcement . . . where there appears to be a violation of 
criminal laws”).  In sum, “violations of Federal law” means 
only what it says; by its plain text, it covers more than just 
criminal violations. 
Finally, that airport contraband is legal in some non-
flight contexts does not change this conclusion.  As long as 
TSOs screen for items federal law bars on airplanes, they are 
searching for “violations of Federal law.”  
B. Usages of “Law Enforcement Officer” Beyond the 
Proviso 
The textual analysis above is enough to satisfy the 
proviso’s four-part definition of “investigative or law 
enforcement officer.”  For three reasons, other statutory 
usages of “law enforcement officer” beyond the proviso do 
not change that outcome. 
First, Congress’s use of the bare term “law 
enforcement officer” says nothing about the term 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” in the proviso.  
“[O]r” is “disjunctive,” and “terms connected by a disjunctive 
[should] be given separate meanings unless the context 
dictates otherwise.”  United States v. Urban, 140 F.3d 229, 
232 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
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also Whether Agents of the Department of Justice Office of 
Inspector General Are ‘Investigative or Law Enforcement 
Officers’ Within the Meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7), 14 Op. 
O.L.C. 107, 108 (1990) (recognizing that the disjunctive “or” 
means that “law enforcement” officers must be different from 
“investigative” officers).  This diminishes any purported 
value of several statutes that define “law enforcement officer” 
in criminal circumstances.  E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8331(20) 
(providing that “‘law enforcement officer’ means . . . .”); 
12 U.S.C. § 248(q)(4) (providing that “the term ‘law 
enforcement officers’ means . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 245(c) 
(same); id. § 1515(a)(4) (same); id. § 115(c)(1) (providing 
that “the term . . . ‘Federal law enforcement officer’ 
means . . . .”).  Deploying these other statutes to discern the 
meaning of § 2680(h) “would render a significant part of [the 
proviso] a nullity,” see Prot. & Advocacy for Persons with 
Disabilities v. Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 448 F.3d 
119, 125 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.), by disregarding its 
reference to “investigative” officers.  That disregard “violates 
the settled rule that a statute must . . . be construed in such 
fashion that every word has some operative effect.”  United 
States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (citations 
omitted). 
Second, it is unnecessary to explore the entire U.S. 
Code to discern the contours of the term “investigative or law 
enforcement officer,” because Congress provided an 
expressly local definition in the proviso.  “When a statute 
includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, 
even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”  
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (citation 
omitted); see also Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 871 
(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that 
we may not resolve any perceived “‘dissonance’ between 
ordinary meaning and the unambiguous words of a definition 
. . . in favor of ordinary meaning” because, “[i]f that were the 
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case, there would hardly be any use in providing a 
definition”).  The proviso fits this rule:  “For the purpose of 
this subsection, ‘investigative or law enforcement officer’ 
means any officer of the United States who is empowered by 
law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests 
for violations of Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, criminal-related definitions of 
“law enforcement officer” are also expressly local.  See, e.g., 
5 U.S.C. § 8331(20) (“For the purpose of this 
subchapter . . . .”); 12 U.S.C. § 248(q)(4) (“For purposes of 
this subsection . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1) (“As used in this 
section . . . .”); id. § 245(c) (“For purposes of the preceding 
sentence . . . .”); id. § 1515(a)(4) (“As used in sections 1512 
and 1513 of this title and in this section . . . .”); id. § 2510(7) 
(“As used in this chapter . . . .”).  In short, the proviso’s own 
definition overrides any other usages of “law enforcement 
officer.”  
Third, Congress knows how to give an explicitly 
“criminal” meaning to the term “law enforcement officer,” 
and it chose not to do so here.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8331(20) 
(defining “law enforcement officer” by reference to “offenses 
against the criminal laws of the United States”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 115(c)(1) (defining “Federal law enforcement officer” by 
reference to “any violation of Federal criminal law”); id. 
§ 2510(7) (defining “investigative or law enforcement 
officer” by reference to “offenses enumerated in this chapter 
[of the criminal title]”); 34 U.S.C. § 12392(b)(2) (“state and 
local criminal law enforcement officials”).  That other usages 
of “law enforcement officer” explicitly speak in terms of 
“criminal” law only heightens the absence of any such 
reference in § 2680(h).  Hence the proviso is not confined to 
“criminal” law enforcement officers. 
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C. No Recourse to Legislative History 
We make no mention of legislative history.  Where a 
statute is unclear on its face, good arguments exist that 
materials making known Congress’s purpose “should be 
respected, lest the integrity of legislation be undermined.”  
Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 4 (2014).  
Accordingly, our Court “has declined to employ legislative 
history if a statute is clear on its face,” but “we have allowed 
recourse to legislative history in the face of ambiguity.”  
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(Smith, J.), aff’d sub nom. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 
223, 242 (2011) (Scalia, J.) (noting that “legislative history is 
persuasive to some because it is thought to shed light on what 
legislators understood an ambiguous statutory text to mean” 
(citation omitted)).   
Here, however, the text tells the tale.  Cf. United States 
v. A.M., 927 F.3d 718, 719 (3d Cir. 2019) (“The text of a law 
governs its reach.  We will neither read in new limits nor read 
out existing limits on its application.”).  Congress could have 
chosen to insert “criminal” into the proviso.  It did not, and 
thus we follow suit.4 
                                              
4  Even precise and voluminous legislative history can be 
off the mark at times.  For example, the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961–68, was enacted in 1970 to combat the rise of 
organized crime.  See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 
U.S. 576, 589 (1981) (“[I]t was the declared purpose of 
Congress ‘to seek the eradication of organized crime in the 
United States . . . .’”) (quoting the statement of findings 
prefacing the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
91-452, 84 Stat. 923); see also 116 Cong. Rec. 602 (1970) 
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 Our following Congress’s lead rests on our view of the 
proper relationship between Congress and the courts.  As we 
recently put it, 
[t]he critical question is who should decide 
whether to provide for a damages remedy, 
Congress or the courts?  Most often, the answer 
is Congress.  Because, when an issue involves a 
host of considerations that must be weighed and 
appraised, it should be committed to those who 
write the laws rather than those who interpret 
them.   
                                                                                                     
(remarks of Sen. Yarborough) (“a full scale attack on 
organized crime”); id. at 819 (remarks of Sen. Scott) 
(“purpose is to eradicate organized crime in the United 
States”); id. at 35199 (remarks of Rep. Rodino) (“a truly full-
scale commitment to destroy the insidious power of organized 
crime groups”).  But, following “the statute as written” to its 
logical linguistic conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed 
private civil actions under RICO against not only “the 
archetypal, intimidating mobster,” but also “respected and 
legitimate enterprises.”  Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 
U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (quotation marks omitted).  In doing so, 
the Court recognized that RICO was “evolving into 
something quite different from the original conception of its 
enactors,” id. at 500, but insisted that the job of correcting 
“this defect — if [a] defect it is — . . . lie[s] with Congress,” 
id. at 499.  “[T]he fact that RICO has been applied in 
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not 
demonstrate ambiguity.  It demonstrates breadth.”  Id. 
(quotations omitted).  So too with the proviso. 
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Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 206 (citations and quotations 
omitted).  Our reading today is consistent with this 
conception of the judicial role.  As counsel for the 
Government put it at oral argument, “ultimately it’s up to 
Congress to create a remedy.”  Tr. of En Banc Oral Arg. at 
44:9–10.  Here, Congress has created a remedy; we are 
simply giving effect to the plain meaning of its words. 
D. Consequences of Our Ruling 
Before concluding, we note the implications of the 
choice before us.  If TSOs are not “investigative or law 
enforcement officers” under the proviso, then plaintiffs like 
Pellegrino are left with no avenue for redress.  We have 
already held (and correctly so) that TSOs are not susceptible 
to an implied right of action under Bivens for alleged 
constitutional violations, see Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 209, so 
a Tort Claims Act action is the only remaining route to 
recovery.  Without recourse under that Act, plaintiffs like 
Pellegrino will have no remedy when TSOs assault them, 
wrongfully detain them, or even fabricate criminal charges 
against them. 
If, on the other hand, TSOs are “investigative or law 
enforcement officers,” we discern no risk of sweeping 
liability and certainly no concomitant threat to the public fisc.  
In 2015, for example, fewer than 200 people (out of over 700 
million screened) filed complaints with the TSA alleging 
harm that would fall within the scope of the proviso.  
Corrected Tr. of Panel Oral Arg. at 26:8–17.  In 2017, only 
one out of every 100,000 passengers lodged a complaint 
about the “courtesy” of a TSO, see Gary S. Becker, TSA 
Complaint Data Reveals Airport Screening Trends, Security 
Debrief (Mar. 16, 2018), 
http://securitydebrief.com/2018/03/16/tsa-complaint-data-
airport-screening/, a statistic beyond suits alleging harm that 
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could fit § 2680(h).  If past is prologue, a passenger is 
unlikely to bother bringing a suit short of facing mistreatment 
akin to Pellegrino’s. 
Nor is our ruling meant to draw every administrative 
search into the ambit of the proviso.  As explained above, 
TSO screenings fall within the proviso because they are more 
personal than traditional administrative inspections:  They 
extend to the general public and involve searches of an 
individual’s physical person and her property.  See supra pp. 
20–22. 
Conclusion 
Words matter.  This core tenet of statutory 
interpretation channels our conclusion today:  TSOs are 
“investigative or law enforcement officers” as defined in the 
Tort Claims Act at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  They are “officer[s] 
of the United States” by dint of their title, badge, and 
authority.  They are “empowered by law to execute searches” 
because, by statutory command and implementing regulation, 
they may physically examine passengers and the property 
they bring with them to airports.  And the TSOs’ searches are 
“for violations of Federal law” given that their inspections are 
for items that federal law bans on aircraft (often with criminal 
consequences). 
As nearly all of us can attest who have flown on an 
aircraft in the United States, the overwhelming majority of 
TSOs perform their jobs professionally despite far more 
grumbling than appreciation.  Their professionalism is 
commensurate with the seriousness of their role in keeping 
our skies safe.  The life-and-death duties entrusted to them 
fall naturally within the ambit of the proviso. 
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Thus we reverse the decision of the District Court as it 
pertains to the interpretation of the proviso in the Tort Claims 
Act.  We affirm in all other respects. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge, dissenting, joined by JORDAN, 
HARDIMAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.   
The Majority and I agree that words matter, that our role 
is to interpret Congress’s statute and not to rewrite it, and that 
the United States retains sovereign immunity absent a clear and 
unambiguous waiver.  But our statutory analyses of the so-
called “law enforcement proviso” lead us to very different 
conclusions and demonstrate definitively, in my view, that 
TSA screeners do not qualify as “investigative or law 
enforcement officers.”  At the very minimum, however, these 
two thoughtful opinions demonstrate that the proviso is 
susceptible to divergent yet “plausible interpretation[s].”  FAA 
v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290–91 (2012).  That conclusion, in 
and of itself, requires us to affirm the District Court’s dismissal 
of Pellegrino’s FTCA claims because “a waiver of sovereign 
immunity must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text,” 
and “[a]ny ambiguities in the statutory language are to be 
construed in favor of immunity.”  Id. at 290 (quoting Lane v. 
Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). 
From its earliest days, the Supreme Court has counseled 
that the “meaning of a word, and consequently, the intention of 
the legislature,” must be “ascertained by reference to the 
context” in which that word appears.  Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 
704, 709 (1878).  I therefore read the words at issue in the 
context of the statute as a whole and of settled Fourth 
Amendment doctrine to conclude that the law enforcement 
proviso is limited by its terms to officers empowered to 
exercise traditional police powers—including investigatory 
searches for law enforcement purposes, but not administrative 
searches for programmatic purposes. 
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The Majority, by contrast, dissects the law enforcement 
proviso into individual words and isolated phrases—text 
without context—and picks the broadest conceivable 
definition of each word.  It thereby recasts Congress’s chosen 
words—“any officer of the United States empowered by law 
to execute searches . . . for violations of Federal law”—in its 
own mold as “any Federal employee empowered to perform a 
Fourth Amendment search . . . for any purpose.”  In this way, 
the Majority provides a remedy where Congress has not and 
sweeps in not just TSA screeners, but also countless other civil 
servants, simply because they (a) are employed by the federal 
government; and (b) have authority to perform inspections, 
issue administrative subpoenas, conduct audits, perform drug 
testing, or conduct any of the countless other routine, 
suspicionless searches authorized by federal law. 
That breathtaking expansion of the proviso is textually 
unsound, departs from other circuits, and contravenes the rule 
that waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed 
in favor of the Government.  Because we should be reading 
Congress’s words together to give them the meaning that 
Congress intended and because we should not subject the 
United States Treasury to vast tort liability where Congress has 
not done so clearly and unambiguously, I respectfully dissent. 
I. The Plain Language of the Proviso Excludes 
Administrative Employees, Like TSA Screeners, 
Who Conduct Routine, Suspicionless Searches 
As with all cases involving statutory interpretation, the 
text must guide our analysis.  But text cannot be interpreted in 
a vacuum.  In law as in life, the meaning that we ascribe to 
words depends on the words that surround them, considering 
both “the specific context in which that language is used, and 
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the broader context of the statute as a whole.”  Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); see Abramski v. 
United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (explaining that courts 
must “interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with 
reference to the statutory context”).  If a friend told me she was 
“held up,” for example, I would need to consider the context to 
know if she had been robbed or merely delayed.  As applied to 
statutes, this commonsense principle, in legal jargon termed 
noscitur a sociis, is “wisely applied where a word is capable of 
many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended 
breadth to the Acts of Congress.”  Dolan v. USPS, 546 U.S. 
481, 486 (2006) (quoting Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 
U.S. 303, 307 (1961)). 
Applying this principle to interpret the words of the law 
enforcement proviso in their statutory context, TSA screeners 
are neither “empowered by law to execute searches, to seize 
evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law,” nor 
empowered by law as “officer[s] of the United States.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
A. Screeners Are Not “Empowered by Law to 
Conduct Searches . . . for Violations of 
Federal Law” 
The law enforcement proviso waives sovereign 
immunity only if the alleged tortfeasor “is empowered by law 
to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for 
violations of Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  The Majority 
contends the proviso covers TSA screeners because they are 
“empowered by law to execute searches . . . for violations of 
Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (emphasis added).  Read in 
context, however, “execute searches . . . for violations of 
Federal law” connotes traditional police powers and refers to 
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investigatory searches, not administrative searches. 
1. The Law Distinguishes Between 
Investigatory and Administrative Searches, 
with TSA Screeners Conducting Only the 
Latter 
To interpret the meaning of “execute searches . . . for 
violations of Federal law,” I begin with contemporaneous 
dictionaries and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  While 
leaning on Black’s Law Dictionary to pick a favored definition 
of “officer,” see Maj. Op. 9, the Majority omits that the same 
edition defined “search” as “[a]n examination of a man’s house 
or other buildings or premises, or of his person, with a view to 
the discovery of . . . some evidence of guilt to be used in the 
prosecution of a criminal action.”1  Search, Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1518 (4th ed. 1968) (emphasis added).  As this 
definition reflects, when Congress passed the law enforcement 
proviso in 1974, “execute search,” just like “seize evidence” 
and “make arrests,” referred in the law primarily to the exercise 
                                              
1 In a curious “see also” citation, the Majority quotes 
what it describes as a definition of “[s]earch” that purportedly 
would cover TSA screenings.  See Maj. Op. 14.  But the 
Majority is not quoting the definition of “search,” but rather 
the definition of the separate entry for “unlawful search.”  And 
once the omission in the Majority’s quotation is restored, it is 
clear that the definition actually refers to traditional 
investigatory searches: “[a]n examination or inspection 
without authority of law of premises or person with view to 
discovery of stolen, contraband, or illicit property, or for some 
evidence of guilt to be used in prosecution of criminal action.”  
Unlawful Search, Black’s Law Dictionary 1518 (4th ed. 1968) 
(emphasis added). 
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of traditional police powers. 
At that time, “search” had only recently entered the 
legal lexicon to refer to examinations “for non-law-
enforcement purposes such as employee drug screenings, 
building inspections, health inspections, and other 
administrative inspections.”  Special-Needs Doctrine, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see Administrative Search, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (origin date of 1960); 
Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 
111 Colum. L. Rev. 254, 260 (2011) (noting that “the concept 
of administrative searches first entered the law in the 1960s”).  
To distinguish these searches from investigatory ones, they 
were (and often still are) called “inspections,” “inspection 
searches,” “regulatory searches,” or “administrative searches.”  
Administrative Search, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 
2019); see Inspection Searches, Black’s Law Dictionary 717 
(5th ed. 1979). 
Then, as now, the distinction between these two types 
of searches undergirds much of Fourth Amendment doctrine.  
In its foray into administrative searches, the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment posed no barrier, because they 
were not “searches for evidence to be used in criminal 
prosecutions.”  Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959); 
see 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 10.1(a) (5th ed. 
2018) (observing that under Frank the Fourth Amendment’s 
applicability “depended upon whether the search was a part of 
a criminal investigation which might lead to prosecution”).  
Even when later overruling Frank, the Court deemed 
administrative searches a distinct category of “search” that did 
not require individualized suspicion because a routine 
inspection presented “a less hostile intrusion than the typical 
policeman’s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of 
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crime.”  Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of San 
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 530, 538 (1967).  And to this day, the 
Court continues to differentiate between investigatory and 
administrative searches, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 
U.S. 32, 37 (2000), with the “critical” distinction between these 
two types of searches lying in their “primary purpose,” 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83–84 (2001).   
Investigatory searches, which pertain “to criminal 
investigations, not routine, noncriminal procedures,” Colorado 
v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987) (citation omitted), have as 
their “primary purpose . . . to detect evidence of ordinary 
criminal wrongdoing,” and serve “the general purpose of 
investigating crime,” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38, 39; see 
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73, 77, 83 (distinguishing searches with 
“criminal investigatory purposes” and “the immediate 
objective . . . to generate evidence for law enforcement 
purposes” from “constitutionally permissible suspicionless 
searches” (emphasis omitted)); Whren v. United States, 517 
U.S. 806, 811–12 (1996) (distinguishing searches for 
“violation of law” from administrative searches). 
Administrative searches, on the other hand, require 
neither individualized suspicion nor a warrant, but only 
because “the ‘primary purpose’ of the search[] is 
‘[d]istinguishable from the general interest in crime control’” 
and is “other than conducting criminal investigations.”2  City 
                                              
2 While the Supreme Court has also deemed school 
searches a type of “special needs” search, they differ from 
administrative searches because they are conducted to 
determine whether a child “has violated or is violating . . . the 
law” and therefore require reasonable suspicion.  New Jersey 
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of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (quoting 
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44).  These administrative searches are 
ubiquitous and include regulatory searches, Colonnade 
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 74 (1970), 
administrative subpoenas, Donovan v. Lane Steer, Inc., 464 
U.S. 408, 415 (1984), inventory searches, South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 382–83 (1976), workplace drug 
testing, Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620–
21 (1989), and border checkpoints, United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)—just to name a few. 
Of these two types of searches, the screenings “now 
routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other official 
buildings,” Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997), fall 
squarely within the realm of “administrative searches,” Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 
(1989).  At airports, such suspicionless screenings are not 
implemented to gather evidence of a crime with an eye toward 
criminal prosecution,3 but rather to effect “an administrative 
                                              
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009); see O’Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (declining to resolve whether 
workplace searches require individualized suspicion).  School 
searches are therefore “special needs” searches not because 
they further an administrative purpose, but because of the 
government’s unique role as custodian of children.  See T.L.O., 
469 U.S. at 342. 
 
3 Most of the prohibited items for which TSA screeners 
search are perfectly legal to possess in other contexts.  See 
What Can I Bring?, TSA, https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-
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purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or 
explosives aboard aircraft,” United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 
955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted), and thereby “prevent[] hijacking or like 
damage,” Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3 (quoting United States 
v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.)). 
Unsurprisingly, then, TSA policy directs that screenings 
“be tailored to the transportation security purpose for which 
they are conducted” and forbids “[a]dministrative and special 
needs searches . . . to detect evidence of crimes unrelated to 
transportation security.”  TSA Mgmt. Directive No. 100.4 
¶¶ 6.B(1), C(1).  If a screener’s preventative screening happens 
to uncover evidence of a crime, she must “refer it to a 
supervisor or a law enforcement official for appropriate 
action”; she cannot seize the item, continue searching, or make 
an arrest.  Id. ¶ 6.C(1); see also id. ¶ 6.G(2).  The “only TSA 
personnel who [can] engage in law enforcement activities”—
such as detentions, arrests, seizures, and investigatory 
searches—are TSA “law enforcement officers.”  Id. ¶ 6.G(3); 
see TSA Mgmt. Directive No. 1100.88-1 ¶ 4.A. 
Thus, properly framed, the question presented today is 
                                              
screening/whatcanibring/all (last visited Aug. 13, 2019).  Thus, 
if an individual is found with a prohibited item, the TSA can 
impose only civil penalties:  “Criminal penalties and fines are 
different and wholly separate from the civil penalties assessed 
by TSA,” and “[r]eferral for criminal investigation and 
enforcement is appropriate where there appears to be a 
violation of criminal laws.”  Enforcement Sanction Guidance 
Policy, TSA, https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/ 
enforcement_sanction_guidance_policy.pdf (last visited Aug. 
13, 2019); see also 49 C.F.R. § 1503.401. 
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whether, in enacting the proviso, Congress meant to include 
only traditional investigatory searches aimed at uncovering 
“evidence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of a criminal 
action,” Search, Black’s Law Dictionary 1518 (4th ed. 1968), 
or also the then-newly recognized class of administrative 
searches. 
2. The Law Enforcement Proviso Covers Only 
Investigatory Searches 
In determining whether Congress intended to cover 
administrative searches, we need not look beyond the proviso’s 
inclusion of “execute,” “for violations of Federal law,” the 
other duties (“seize evidence” and “make arrests”), 
“investigatory or law enforcement officer,” and a narrowly 
defined list of intentional torts.  Each phrase suggests that 
Congress intended to refer only to investigatory searches, and 
together, they convey Congress’s unmistakable intent. 
Execute Searches.  The proviso does not use the word 
“search” alone; it refers to the power to “execute searches”—a 
term of art.  Without exception, every other statute in the 
United States Code that uses this phrase refers to investigatory 
searches.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2231(a); id. § 2234; id. § 3109; 22 
U.S.C. § 2709(a)(2).  So does every Supreme Court and circuit 
case that had been published before the proviso was enacted.  
See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756 (1969); Ng 
Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626, 628 (9th Cir. 1965).  
Conversely, Congress typically uses markedly different 
phrasing when granting employees the power to perform 
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administrative searches.4  See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a) (TSA 
screeners conduct “screening[s]”); 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2) 
(OSHA inspectors may “inspect and investigate”); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 374(a)(1) (FDA inspectors may “enter” and “inspect”); 42 
U.S.C. § 6927(a) (authorizing EPA inspectors “to enter” and 
“to inspect”).  Use of the phrase “execute searches” thus 
signifies Congress’s intent to refer to investigatory searches. 
Implying that it has some relevance to the plain meaning 
of “execute searches,” the Majority observes that Congress 
sometimes uses “milder” verbs than “execute” in the criminal 
context and that the proviso does not include the terms 
“warrant” or “search warrant.”  Maj. Op. 18.  But those 
observations are neither here nor there:  The point is not that 
“execute” is a “harsh” word (as opposed to a “mild” one), but 
that the words “execute” and “search” must be read together, 
not in isolation.  When Congress uses the phrase “execute 
searches,” it invariably refers to traditional investigatory 
searches.  And, of course, “execut[ing] searches” in the 
criminal context is not limited to the execution of warrants.  
Investigatory searches also include brief stops if an officer 
reasonably suspects that “criminal activity may be afoot,” 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); searches incident to arrest 
to protect officers and “to prevent the concealment or 
destruction” of evidence, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 
(2009) (internal alterations, emphasis, and citation omitted); 
and protective sweeps “to ensure [officers’] safety after, and 
                                              
4 The section of the ATSA that the Majority quotes for 
the proposition that TSA screeners conduct “physical 
search[es],” Maj. Op. 13, 14, in fact relates to searches of 
cargo, not passengers, see 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)(4).   
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while making, [an] arrest,” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 
334 (1990). 
For Violations of Federal Law.  Beyond the word 
“execute,” the term “searches” is further qualified by the 
phrase “for violations of Federal law.”5  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  
That phrase immediately follows a “single, integrated list,” so 
it modifies each term in the list.  Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 
344 n.4 (2005); see also Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 
434, 447 (2014).  And “violations of Federal law” must refer 
to criminal law given that the phrase also modifies “make 
arrests,” which can only be made for violations of Federal 
criminal law.  Otherwise, the phrase “for violations of Federal 
law” would carry one meaning when modifying “make arrests” 
                                              
5 The Majority expresses skepticism on this point based 
on the rule of the last antecedent.  Maj. Op. 23.  But, as the 
Supreme Court recently cautioned, “that . . . rule would not be 
appropriate where the ‘modifying clause appear[s] . . . at the 
end of a single, integrated list.’”  Lockhart v. United States, 136 
S. Ct. 958, 965 (2016) (second and third alteration in original) 
(quoting Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 344 n.4 (2005)).  Instead, 
where, as here, “the listed items are simple and parallel without 
unexpected internal modifiers or structure,” and are “items that 
readers are used to seeing listed together”—much less where it 
is “a concluding modifier that readers are accustomed to 
applying to each of them”—that modifier should be read as 
applying to each item.  Id. at 963 (providing as an example “the 
laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  Those 
descriptions apply to a tee to the way “for violations of Federal 
law” modifies “to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to 
make arrests” in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).   
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yet another when modifying “execute searches.”  That cannot 
be.  See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005) (“To 
give the[] same words a different meaning for each category 
would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one.”). 
Given the criminal connotation of “for violations of 
Federal law,” i.e., “to generate evidence for law enforcement 
purposes,” Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83, instead of for 
“programmatic purpose[s],” id. at 81, the searches TSA 
screeners conduct simply are not “search[es] . . . for violations 
of Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  That screeners conduct 
searches, up to and including pat-downs and property searches, 
only for an administrative purpose was the premise of United 
States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 181 n.13 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(Alito, J.), and the condition of their constitutionality set by the 
Supreme Court in Von Raab, Chandler, and Edmond.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court “ha[s] never approved a checkpoint 
program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of 
ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”  Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.  To 
the contrary, it has repeatedly explained that if the purpose of 
a routine, suspicionless search is for “violation[s] of law,” 
Whren, 517 U.S. at 811, and not to serve “special needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” the entire 
program would be unconstitutional, Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37; 
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 (holding that the search must advance 
an interest “divorced from the State’s general interest in law 
enforcement”).   
The Majority argues that because carrying weapons or 
explosives on an aircraft is a criminal offense and screeners are 
authorized to search for those items, screeners are searching 
“for violations of Federal law,” even if that does have criminal 
connotations.  But aside from the constitutional cloud that 
would place over the entire TSA screening program, this 
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argument misapprehends the administrative search doctrine.  
There is no doubt that (as in Pellegrino’s case) a screening 
aimed at removing prohibited items may turn up evidence of a 
crime and lead to prosecution, just as may a sobriety 
checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road or 
a border search aimed at removing illegal aliens from 
smuggling operations.  But the Supreme Court has made clear 
that such inspections do not become searches for “violation[s] 
of law,” Whren, 517 U.S. at 811, as the Majority suggests, 
“simply because, in the course of enforcing [the regulatory 
scheme], an inspecting officer may discover evidence of 
crimes.”6  New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 (1987).     
                                              
6 Sobriety checkpoints and border searches, like TSA 
screenings, are quintessential administrative searches because 
their immediate purpose is not “crime control,” but to 
“apprehend[] stolen vehicles” and “reduc[e] the immediate 
hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the 
highways,”  Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39, 40; see generally Mich. 
Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990), or to 
“[i]nterdict[] the flow of illegal entrants.”  Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U.S. at 552.  The Court only “tolerate[s] suspension of the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant or probable-cause requirement” 
in routine administrative searches like TSA screenings 
“because there [is] no law enforcement purpose behind the 
searches in those cases, and there [is] little, if any, 
entanglement with law enforcement.”  Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 
79 n.15.  Hence the sharp divide between screeners who 
conduct preventative searches and TSA “law enforcement 
officer[s]” to whom screeners are required to “refer” the 
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In sum, screeners can conduct routine, suspicionless 
searches only for the programmatic purpose of removing 
prohibited items, which is designed to prevent “violations of 
Federal law” from occurring; they do not search, and may not 
constitutionally search, “for violations of Federal law.” 
“Seize Evidence” and “Make Arrests.”  The other terms 
in the list (“seize evidence” and “make arrests”) provide 
important context.  As the Majority concedes, “make arrests” 
necessarily carries criminal connotations.  See Maj. Op. 17.  So 
does “seize evidence.”7  Under the canon noscitur a sociis, 
Congress’s listing of “execute searches” alongside “seize 
evidence” and “make arrests”—three actions routinely listed in 
tandem to describe police powers, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. 
§ 878(a)—reinforces that it intended to limit “searches” to 
                                              
continuation of any search that happens to turn up criminal 
evidence.  TSA Mgmt. Directive 100.4 ¶¶ 6.C(1), 6.G(2). 
 
7 The word “seize” in this context comes directly from 
the Fourth Amendment, see U.S. Const. amend. IV (requiring 
that a warrant describe the “things to be seized”), and Congress 
uses the phrase in the criminal context throughout the United 
States Code, see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2270; 10 U.S.C. §§ 282–283; 
16 U.S.C. § 1437; 34 U.S.C. § 21114; id. § 30103; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9153; 49 U.S.C. § 114(p).  The Supreme Court also uses the 
phrase routinely to connote the seizure of evidence in criminal 
matters.  See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 
n.23 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 577 n.5 (1980); 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 167 (1978); Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489 (1961).   
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those conducted for investigatory, not administrative, 
purposes. 
In a cautionary tale, albeit not heeded by the Majority, 
the Supreme Court held that a nearby provision in the FTCA 
barring claims arising out of the “loss, miscarriage, or 
negligent transmission of letters or postal matter,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(b), did not extend to mail carriers creating slip-and-fall 
hazards.  Dolan, 546 U.S. at 483.  Although acknowledging 
that the phrase “negligent transmission” of mail could, “[i]f 
considered in isolation, . . . embrace a wide range of negligent 
acts,” the Court cautioned that a word “may or may not extend 
to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities.”  Id. at 486.  
The other terms specified in the list (“loss” and “miscarriage”), 
the Court concluded, “limit the reach of transmission.”8  Id.   
So too in § 2680(h)—just a few subsections later—
where the terms “seize evidence” and “make arrests” are 
properly read in the proviso to “limit the reach,” id., of 
“execute searches.” 
Investigative or Law Enforcement Officer.  The very 
term being defined here—“investigative or law enforcement 
                                              
8 The Majority balks at applying noscitur a sociis to the 
law enforcement proviso because it contains the disjunctive 
“or.”  Maj. Op. 18.  But the Supreme Court did not hesitate to 
use it in Dolan and, indeed, has used the canon many times in 
precisely this way.  See, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 136 
S. Ct. 2355, 2368–69 (2016) (“question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding, or controversy”); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
1074, 1085–86 (2015) (“record, document, or tangible 
object”); Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307, 310 (“exploration, 
discovery, or prospecting”). 
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officer”—also naturally evokes criminal law enforcement.  See 
generally United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010) 
(“[A]n unclear definitional phrase may take meaning from the 
term to be defined.”).  The only other statutes found in the 
United States Code that employ analogous terminology are the 
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 3121–3127, which 
Congress enacted six years before the law enforcement 
proviso, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1809, 1827, which was enacted four years 
afterward.  Both statutes use the term to identify who can 
lawfully conduct or receive information about wiretaps or 
electronic surveillance—classic examples of investigatory 
searches.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1809, 1827.  
And notably, in construing “investigative or law enforcement 
officer” under the Wiretap Act, the Office of Legal Counsel 
recognized that the powers of an “investigative . . . officer” do 
not coincide with those of a “law enforcement officer” but that 
both positions execute criminal law enforcement functions.9  
See 14 Op. O.L.C. 107, 108 (1990). 
                                              
9 The Majority suggests that I render the remainder of 
the law enforcement proviso a nullity by interpreting 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” to refer to officers 
with criminal law authority.  See Maj. Op. 25.  But as the Office 
of Personnel Management’s Occupational Handbook makes 
clear, numerous investigative officers are not law enforcement 
officers, see OPM, Handbook of Occupational Groups and 
Families 109 (Dec. 2018), and not all investigative officers 
“execute searches, seize evidence, or make arrests,” compare 
id. at 1801, 1810 (“[g]eneral,” i.e., administrative 
investigators), with id. at 109 (criminal investigators).  Thus, 
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Intentional Torts Covered.  Finally, the law 
enforcement proviso waives immunity only for the types of tort 
claims typically asserted against traditional investigative or 
law enforcement officers—assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious 
prosecution; it preserves the United States’s immunity for libel, 
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with 
contract rights.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  The Majority brushes 
this point off by saying that the specific tort claims in the 
proviso can be brought against administrative employees like 
screeners.  But that begs the question:  Before today’s holding, 
sovereign immunity precluded these intentional tort claims 
from being brought against any employee of an administrative 
agency. 
Congress’s intentional selection of torts premised on 
use of excessive force and lack of probable cause cannot be 
waved aside by the observation that screeners, like any other 
federal employee, can commit “assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or 
interference with contract rights.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  The 
point is that, of those intentional torts for which Congress 
                                              
the proviso’s definition of “investigative or law enforcement 
officer” is necessary to distinguish between investigative 
officers involved in criminal investigations conducted for 
violations of federal law and those involved in administrative 
searches conducted for other purposes.  Nor is it unusual for 
Congress to define “law enforcement officer” by reference to 
the officer’s duties, even if those duties all sound in criminal 
law.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8331(20); 12 U.S.C. § 248(q)(4); 18 
U.S.C. § 245(c); id. § 1515(a)(4). 
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preserved sovereign immunity, it excepted only torts typically 
associated with traditional police powers for the proviso. 
For these reasons, the law enforcement proviso evinces 
no intent to waive sovereign immunity for administrative 
searches.  And on that basis alone, Pellegrino’s FTCA claims 
do not fall within the proviso. 
B. TSA Screeners Are Not “Officers” Under the 
Proviso 
The law enforcement proviso further limits the waiver 
of sovereign immunity to alleged torts committed by 
“officer[s].”  See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  The FTCA does not 
define “officer,” so the Majority turns to dictionaries.  See Maj. 
Op. 9.  But any particular dictionary definition of “officer” 
cannot resolve this question on its own because those 
definitions run the gamut.  See United States v. Costello, 666 
F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The selection of a particular 
. . . [dictionary] definition is not obvious and must be defended 
on some other grounds of suitability.”); see also Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 61, 67 (1994) 
(“[T]he choice among meanings [of words in statutes] must 
have a footing more solid than a dictionary . . . .”).  For every 
broad definition of “officer” that could possibly cover 
screeners, see, e.g., Officer, Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary of the English Language 1567 (1971) (one 
“serv[ing] in a position of trust [or] authority,” or one “charged 
with a duty”), there is a narrower definition requiring far more 
authority than screeners possess—traditional police 
authority—that easily could take its place, see, e.g., Officer, 
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 797 (1976) (“one 
charged with police duties”); Officer, The Random House 
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Dictionary of the English Language 1000 (1973) (“A 
policeman or constable.”). 
Without explanation, the Majority adopts the broadest 
possible dictionary entries, defining “officer” as someone 
“‘charged’ by the Government ‘with the power and duty of 
exercising certain functions,’” Maj. Op. 9 (quoting Officer, 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1235 (4th ed. 1968)), or who “serve[s] 
in a position of trust [or] authority” id. (quoting Officer, 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1567 (1971)).  
Such expansive definitions of “officer” could theoretically pass 
muster if they did no violence to neighboring words in the 
statute.  See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105 
(2000); King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991).  
But here they do. 
1. The Majority’s Reading Gives No Meaning 
to Congress’s Choice of “Officer,” Rather 
Than “Employee,” in the Law Enforcement 
Proviso 
Several provisions in the Federal Tort Claims Act use 
the term “employee” to identify whose acts or omissions are 
covered.  For example, the FTCA grants federal district courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over torts “caused by the negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of any employee.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added).  Similarly, the frequently 
invoked discretionary function exception, found in the very 
same statutory section as the law enforcement proviso, 
reasserts sovereign immunity for “[a]ny claim based upon . . . 
a discretionary function or duty on the part of . . . an employee 
of the Government.”  Id. § 2680(a) (emphasis added).  In stark 
contrast, the law enforcement proviso refers not to 
“employees,” but to “investigative or law enforcement 
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officers,” which it defines as an “officer of the United States 
. . . empowered by law” to perform the enumerated functions.  
Id. § 2680(h) (emphasis added). 
Where, as here, Congress uses certain language in one 
part of a statute but distinct terminology elsewhere, courts 
should “‘presume[]’ that Congress intended a difference in 
meaning.”  Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 
(2014) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 
(1983)); see, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 
n.9 (2004).  If Congress wanted the proviso to sweep broadly, 
it could have—just as in the discretionary function exception a 
few subsections above, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)—defined 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” as any “employee” 
empowered to execute searches.  It did not. 
The Majority disregards this presumption by choosing 
a dictionary definition of “officer” so broad as to render the 
term coextensive with “employee.”  Indeed, I am hard pressed 
to conceive of any employee of an agency who conducts 
administrative searches and is not, as the Majority defines it, in 
“a position of trust and authority,” or, for that matter, any 
federal employee at all who has not been “‘charged’ by the 
Government ‘with the power and duty of exercising certain 
functions.’”  Maj. Op. 9 (citations omitted). 
Instead of conflating “officer” with “employee,” I read 
Congress’s markedly different language in the very same 
statutory section to signal an intent to limit the proviso to a 
specific class of federal government personnel: those “charged 
with police duties.”  Officer, Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary 797 (1976).  After all, the FTCA itself defines 
“[e]mployee of the government” as “officers or employees of 
any federal agency.”  28 U.S.C. § 2671 (emphasis added).  And 
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the law enforcement proviso, in using “officer” to define 
“investigative or law enforcement officer,” likewise specifies 
that such officers be “empowered by law”—i.e., the statute or 
regulation governing that officer’s agency—to perform 
traditional police functions.10  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (emphasis 
added).  And when we look at the statute “empower[ing]” 
screeners, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(ATSA), screeners clearly do not qualify as officers. 
2. The ATSA Distinguishes Between Screeners 
and Officers Empowered with Investigative 
and Law Enforcement Powers 
The ATSA specifies that “screening . . . shall be carried 
out by a Federal Government employee (as defined in section 
2105 of title 5).”  49 U.S.C. § 44901(a) (emphasis added).  This 
contrasts with 49 U.S.C. § 114(p)(1), which permits the TSA 
Administrator to “designate” particular TSA employees “to 
serve as . . . law enforcement officer[s].”  Those distinctions 
between screener “employees” and law enforcement “officers” 
recur throughout the statute.11 
                                              
10 Notably, the only other exception in the FTCA 
mentioning “officers” indisputably refers to law enforcement 
officers.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (“[A]ny officer of customs 
or excise or any other law enforcement officer . . . .”); Ali v. 
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 226 (2008). 
 
11 Compare 49 U.S.C. § 114(e)(2) (providing that the 
TSA Administrator is responsible for “hiring and retention of 
security screening personnel”), id. § 44901(a) (explaining that 
screenings will be performed by an “employee”), id. 
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Only TSA employees designated as “officers” are 
empowered by law to “carry a firearm,” “make an arrest,” and 
“seek and execute warrants for arrest or seizure of evidence,” 
id. § 114(p)(2)—functions that place them squarely within the 
proviso.  Those law enforcement officers are required to be 
stationed “at each airport security screening location,” id. 
§ 44901(h)(1), “to support each system for screening” and 
perform those functions that TSA screeners have neither the 
authority nor the expertise to fulfill, 49 C.F.R. 
§ 1542.215(a)(2). 
And were there any doubt about whether Congress 
intended that mapping, the ATSA dispels it:  Congress 
expressly cross-referenced the FTCA when it distinguished the 
liability of state and local law enforcement officers—who may 
be deputized by the Administrator to supplement “Federal law 
enforcement officers” at airports, 49 U.S.C. § 44922—from 
the liability of “personnel of a qualified private screening 
                                              
§ 44935(e)–(f) (describing training programs, hiring 
qualifications, and employment standards for “[s]ecurity 
screeners”), and id. § 44936(a) (requiring background 
investigation of a “security screener”), with id. § 114(p) 
(describing “law enforcement officer[s]”), id. § 44901(h)(1) 
(requiring the deployment of “law enforcement personnel” at 
screening locations), id. § 44903(a) (defining “law 
enforcement personnel”), and id. § 44922 (permitting the TSA 
Administrator to deputize “state and local law enforcement 
officers”); see also TSA Mgmt. Directive No. 100.4 
(separately defining “law enforcement officer” and 
“transportation security officer”). 
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company”—who may be approved for private contracting by 
the Administrator to assist airport operators under the 
Screening Partnership Program, 49 U.S.C. § 44920.  On the 
one hand, a deputized state or local law enforcement officer 
“shall be treated as a Federal law enforcement officer,” id. 
§ 44922(b), and is expressly made subject to the FTCA “while 
carrying out Federal airport security duties within the course 
and scope of the officer’s employment,”12 id. § 44922(e).  On 
the other hand, contracted airport “screening personnel”—
who, notably, must be overseen by “Federal Government 
supervisors . . . and . . . Federal Government law enforcement 
officers at the airport pursuant to this chapter,” id. 
§ 44920(e)(1)—are not made subject to the FTCA and instead 
retain “liability related to [their] own acts of negligence, gross 
negligence, or intentional wrongdoing,” id. § 44920(g)(3).   
                                              
12 In seeking to downplay the significance of the 
ATSA’s explicit cross-reference to the FTCA, with its 
differential treatment of deputized officers and contracted 
airport screeners under the proviso, the Majority emphasizes 
that § 44922(e) designates a deputized officer an “‘employee 
of the Government’ for purposes of the proviso,” Maj. Op. 11.  
Again, the Majority mistakes meaning for lack of context:  
Section 44922(e) is using “[e]mployee of the Government” as 
a term of art, defined in turn in the FTCA not as limited to 
“employees” but as “officers or employees of any federal 
agency,” 28 U.S.C. § 2671—thus applying the proviso to 
“officers” and again distinguishing between the terms “officer” 
and “employee.”  Congress’s intention to cover deputized 
officers under the proviso but to treat contracted airport 
screeners (like their TSA counterparts) as regular employees 
could not be more clear. 
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Congress could hardly be more explicit that (1) it knew 
it was legislating in the ATSA against the backdrop of the 
FTCA; (2) it intended the terms “employee” and “officer” to 
carry the same meaning in the ATSA and the FTCA; and (3) it 
intended for the TSA’s “law enforcement officers” (whether 
federally employed or deputized) to be treated as “officers” 
subject to the proviso, but for “screeners” (whether federally 
employed or contracted) to be treated as employees who are 
not.  See Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1812 
(2019) (“This Court does not lightly assume that Congress 
silently attaches different meanings to the same term in the 
same or related statutes.”). 
3. The Majority’s Contrary Arguments Are 
Unavailing  
In the face of the plain text to the contrary, the Majority 
offers several reasons why its broad interpretation of “officer,” 
which would encompass a screener, should prevail.  None is 
persuasive. 
First, the Majority tells us that we should not rely on the 
distinction between an “officer” and “employee” in the FTCA 
and ATSA because both statutes define “employee” to include 
“employees” and “officers,” and there can be no “distinction 
between two terms that are not themselves mutually 
exclusive.”  Maj. Op. 11 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671; 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44901(a)).  But the commonsense proposition that “officers” 
are still employed by the Government does not detract from the 
significance of Congress’s choosing different words:  It 
distinguished between “officers” and “employees” and made 
only “officers” subject to the proviso.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); 
49 U.S.C. § 114(p)(1) (allowing the TSA Administrator to 
designate a TSA “employee . . . to serve as a law enforcement 
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officer”).    
Second, the Majority argues against mapping the 
ATSA’s definition of “employee” and “officer” onto the 
FTCA.  But its syllogism is flawed.  According to the Majority, 
(a) because the ATSA defines the term “employee” by 
reference to the general civil-service laws, see 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44901(a) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2105), the term “officer” in the 
ATSA must also be defined by reference to the general civil-
service laws, 5 U.S.C. § 2104 (defining “officer”);13 (b) using 
the civil-service definition of “officer” in the FTCA would 
make the proviso underinclusive because certain officers 
indisputably covered by the proviso, like postal inspectors, are 
not “appointed by the head of an Executive agency,” Maj. Op. 
10 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)); ergo (c) the FTCA must 
define “officer” differently than the ATSA. 
But both premises are wrong.  Congress did not define 
“officer” in the proviso by reference to civil-service laws; it 
told us in no uncertain terms to look to the particular “law” that 
“empower[s]” employees of that agency—here, the ATSA, to 
act as officers; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (defining 
“[e]mployee of the government” for purposes of the FTCA as 
                                              
13 At § 44901(a), the ATSA provides that “screening . . . 
shall be carried out by a Federal Government employee (as 
defined in section 2105 of title 5).”  For its part, the general 
civil-service laws define “employee” as either an officer or any 
other individual appointed by another member of the federal 
government.  5 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(1).  They separately define 
“officer” to refer to individuals who, under the Constitution’s 
Appointments Clause, must be appointed by the President, the 
head of an executive agency or department, or a court.  See id. 
§ 2104(a). 
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“officers or employees of any federal agency”) (emphasis 
added).  Nor did Congress define “officer” in the ATSA by 
way of cross-reference to the civil-service definition, as it did 
for the definition of “employee.”  Instead, the ATSA defines 
“officer” by virtue of the powers bestowed on those 
employees.  See 49 U.S.C. § 114(p).  There is no inconsistency 
in considering the statute and implementing regulations to 
deduce who is empowered by law to act as an “officer” under 
the proviso; that is precisely what Congress directed. 
With that reading, moreover, the FTCA’s reference to 
“officer” is not “underinclusive.”  The laws that empower 
employees of various agencies consistently demarcate those 
who carry police powers from regular employees.  Examples 
include the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7608(a), the 
statute governing postal inspectors, 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a), and 
the implementing regulations for the Department of Homeland 
Security and Drug Enforcement Agency, 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c)–
(e) (DHS); 28 C.F.R. pt. 0, subpt. R, app. § 3 (delegating 
powers under 21 U.S.C. §§ 878–879).  And, as our discussion 
makes clear, when it comes to those with police powers under 
the ATSA, the statute clearly and unambiguously distinguishes 
employees from officers, which TSA screeners are not.  See, 
e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 114(p)(2)(A)–(C). 
Third, the Majority relies on the fact that screeners “are 
officers by name” and “wear uniforms with badges noting that 
title.”  Maj. Op. 10.  It is surprising indeed that such a 
superficial gloss is deemed relevant to understanding a waiver 
of federal sovereign immunity—particularly as these 
employees were originally called “screeners” (and remain so 
in the statute and regulations), and TSA (not Congress) 
changed their name to Transportation Security Officer (TSO) 
in 2005 only in an effort to improve morale and foster “upward 
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mobility opportunities within [the] profession.”14  Notably, 
these changes were intended to “give[] TSOs an opportunity 
. . . to apply for DHS law enforcement positions.”  U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, GAO-07-299, Aviation Security 56 
(Feb. 2007) (emphasis added)—a nonsensical proposition if 
screeners were already investigative or law enforcement 
officers. 
Fourth, the Majority seizes on the modifier “any” before 
“officer” to garner support for its expansive interpretation.  
But, again, this is text without context.  The argument would 
carry appeal “only if we stopped reading right there,” but “we 
do not stop there; we do not read statutes in little bites.”  
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633, 643 (2006).  
Whether “use of the word ‘any’ . . . indicate[s] that Congress 
intended particular statutory text to sweep broadly . . . 
necessarily depends on the statutory context.”  See Nat’l Ass’n 
of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 629 (2018).  The 
definition of “investigative or law enforcement officer” does 
not end after the words “any officer of the United States”; it 
goes on to delineate those officers “empowered by law to” 
perform the traditional police powers that follow.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(h).  TSA screeners are not. 
                                              
14 The Transportation Security Administration’s Airline 
Passenger and Baggage Screening: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 109th Cong. 7 (2006) 
(statement of Edmund “Kip” Hawley, Assistant Sec’y, TSA); 
see Press Release, TSA, Transportation Security Officers Have 
Renewed Focus and New Look on Seventh Anniversary of 9/11 
(Sept. 11, 2008), https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/ 
2008/09/11/transportation-security-officers-have-renewed-
focus-and-new-look-seventh. 
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Finally, relying on Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 
50 (2013), the Majority contends that the Supreme Court has 
cautioned against a “cramped reading of the proviso.”  Maj. 
Op. 12 (citing Millbrook, 569 U.S. at 56–57).  But Millbrook 
had nothing to do with who qualifies as an “officer” under the 
proviso; it held only that the scope of liability for those who 
did qualify as “officers” was not limited to the acts of 
“executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.”  
569 U.S. at 56.  In other words, Millbrook concerned only “the 
acts for which immunity is waived,” not, as here, “the class of 
persons whose acts may give rise to an actionable FTCA 
claim.”  Id. 
In sum, screeners are not “officers” and for that reason, 
too, they are not “investigative or law enforcement officers.” 
II. The Legislative History Confirms That Congress 
Did Not Intend to Cover Administrative Searches 
While legislative history cannot manufacture ambiguity 
where none exists, “for those of us who use legislative history 
to help interpret statutes, the history . . . supports our reading,” 
Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1037 
(2019), confirming the textual cues on which I rely.  The 
Supreme Court and our Circuit have similarly considered 
legislative history as a useful “cross-check.”  United States ex 
rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 880 F.3d 89, 95 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (Ambro, J.); see, e.g., Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 
1066, 1085 (2019). 
Congress did not come to use the word “officer” rather 
than “employee” in the proviso by accident.  Responding to 
two appalling “no-knock” raids by federal narcotics officers, 
Congress considered three bills to amend the broad immunity 
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preserved by the intentional tort exception, with Members 
referring regularly to the other bills as each was debated.  Jack 
Boger et al., The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts 
Amendment: An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L. Rev. 497, 
510–17 (1976).  Two of the bills waived sovereign immunity 
for the specified intentional torts for all federal employees.  Id.  
But Congress enacted a third bill (the “Proviso Bill”) that 
limited the waiver of immunity to “investigative or law 
enforcement officers.”  See Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)). 
In its deliberations, policymakers discussed the fact that 
the Proviso Bill, unlike the other bills, would not cover federal 
employees who perform administrative searches.  Some 
observed that the Proviso Bill “only applies to law enforcement 
officers.  It does not apply to any other Federal employees that 
might violate the rights of an individual.”  120 Cong. Rec. 5287 
(statements of Reps. Donohue and Wiggins).  Others, urging 
passage of the alternative bills that waived immunity for all 
federal employees, lamented that the Proviso Bill would 
provide no remedy for assaults committed by those who 
perform administrative searches:  “We have Department of 
Agriculture investigators who go [in to] look at books and 
records. We have Defense Department auditors to look at 
books and records. . . . They are not law enforcement officers 
even under this definition.  They don’t qualify.”15  But the 
                                              
15 Federal Tort Claims Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 
10439 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental 
Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 18 
(1974) [hereinafter H.R. 10439 Hearings] (testimony of Irving 
Jaffe, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen.); see also id. at 15 
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Proviso Bill carried the day. 
 The legislative history concerning the particular torts 
selected for the proviso also confirms my plain text reading:  
Congress’s intention, in excepting “assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, [and] malicious 
prosecution,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), from the broader list of 
immunized torts was to cover “the types of tort[s] most 
frequently arising out of activities of Federal law enforcement 
officers.”  H.R. 10439 Hearings at 14 (statement of Jaffe); see 
also 119 Cong. Rec. 33,496 (1973) (giving verbatim 
explanation in reference to S. 2558). 
This history simply corroborates what the text itself 
conveys:  After debating competing options, Congress decided 
to afford a remedy only to “victims of Federal law enforcement 
abuses.”  Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1235 (2d Cir. 
1982) (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-588, at 4 (1973)); see Carlson 
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (“Congress amended FTCA 
in 1974 to create a cause of action against the United States for 
intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement 
officers.”). 
  
                                              
(testimony of Irving Jaffe) (“It should be noted that . . . H.R. 
8245 is confined in its applicability to Federal investigative or 
law enforcement officers, while . . . H.R. 10439 would waive 
the sovereign immunity of the United States as to the same acts 
or omissions on the part of all Government employees.”). 
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III. The Majority’s Approach Waives Sovereign 
Immunity for All Employees Who Conduct 
Administrative Searches 
After dismissing “[a]ttempts to distinguish . . . between 
administrative and criminal ‘searches’” as purportedly 
“divorced from the plain text,” the Majority offers up an 
atextual reading, positing that a distinction could be drawn 
between physical and nonphysical searches.  Maj. Op. 14, 20.  
But the Majority provides no principled basis for that 
distinction.  That is because there is not one:  Its reading 
sweeps in all administrative searches. 
A. The Majority Offers No Principled Basis for 
Limiting Its Reading to Physical Searches 
Uneasy with the breadth of its holding, the Majority 
posits that TSA screenings can be distinguished from other 
administrative searches because they may include pat-downs.  
For an opinion premised on adhering to the text’s plain 
meaning, this marks a striking shift.  Nothing in the proviso 
even remotely hints at a distinction between administrative 
searches that include pat-downs and administrative searches 
that do not.  It does not use the term “physical searches,” but 
simply “searches.”  My colleagues cannot in the same breath 
proclaim fidelity to the text and devise an atextual line between 
“physical searches” and “non-physical searches” to attempt to 
cabin the proviso’s reach:  Congress either intended the proviso 
to waive sovereign immunity for those conducting both 
categories of Fourth Amendment “searches”—investigatory 
and administrative—or it did not.   
Not only is this reading of the proviso as limited to 
“physical searches” atextual, it is made out of whole cloth.  The 
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Supreme Court has never distinguished between administrative 
searches that include pat-downs and other administrative 
searches.  To the contrary, it has treated administrative 
searches that include physical searches—such as drug 
screenings, searches at the entrances of certain government 
buildings, airport screenings, border inspections, and sobriety 
checkpoints—like any other kind of administrative search.  
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39, 41–42, 47–48.  The distinction the 
Court has drawn is not between physical and non-physical 
searches, but between administrative searches for 
“programmatic purposes” and investigatory searches to 
“uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”  Id. at 
42, 45–46; see supra at 4–9.   
The Majority also suggests that its expansion of the 
proviso today is limited only to TSA screenings because “they 
extend to the general public and involve examinations, often 
intrusive, of an individual’s physical person along with her 
property.”  Maj. Op. 22.  But those features are not unique to 
airport searches.  Searches to which the general public is 
subjected involving examinations of persons and property are 
“now routine . . . at entrances to courts and other official 
buildings.”  Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.  They are “used widely 
at state and local levels to enforce laws regarding drivers’ 
licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar 
matters.”  Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560 n.14.  All federal 
agencies “may, at their discretion, inspect packages, briefcases 
and other containers in the immediate possession of . . . 
persons arriving on, working at, visiting, or departing from 
Federal property.”  41 C.F.R. § 102-74.370.  And regulations 
also authorize such searches, including pat-downs, at cruise-
ship terminals, 33 C.F.R. § 105.290, prison visitor entrances, 
28 C.F.R. § 543.13(f), chemical facilities, 6 C.F.R. 
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§ 27.230(a)(3), and nuclear sites, 10 C.F.R. § 73.46(d)(4)(i).  
We cannot pluck TSA screenings from Pandora’s box without 
casting it open.   
Finally, the Majority errs in conflating airport pat-
downs with Terry stops.  Airport pat-downs serve a 
programmatic purpose; Terry stops require individualized 
suspicion.  We made that point clearly in Hartwell, where we 
upheld a frisk “without individualized suspicion” of an airport 
passenger as “permissible under the administrative search 
doctrine.”  436 F.3d at 181.  Hartwell further observed that, 
unlike Terry stops, airport screenings are “well-tailored to 
protect personal privacy,” lack virtually any stigma, provide 
passengers with advance notice, and are “made under 
supervision and not far from the scrutiny of the traveling 
public.”  Id. at 180–81 (citation omitted).  Terry stops are on 
the other side of that Fourth Amendment divide:  They require 
a “reasonable belief” that “criminal activity may be afoot.”  
392 U.S. at 28, 30. 
In the end, the Majority succumbs to the siren call that 
we need only concern ourselves today with “hold[ing] . . . that 
TSO screenings are ‘searches’ under the proviso,” leaving 
future panels to fend off the consequences.  Maj. Op. 22.  But 
we should not undertake even a purportedly narrow holding—
and the Majority’s holding is far from narrow—without having 
both a principled basis and a considered view of the 
repercussions.  The Majority’s inability to identify any 
sustainable distinction between TSA screenings and other 
administrative searches does not bode well for either. 
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B. The Majority’s Approach Would Naturally 
Result in the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for 
All Employees Who Perform Administrative 
Searches 
Without a limiting principle, the Majority’s 
interpretation of the law enforcement proviso works a 
staggering expansion of the Government’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity.  Much of what administrative agencies and their 
employees are empowered to do qualifies as a “search” under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Several agencies routinely perform 
audit examinations.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 483 (Federal 
Reserve); 17 C.F.R. § 1.31(d)(1) (CFTC).  Nearly all agencies 
exercise the subpoena power to inspect the books and records 
of regulated or contracting parties.  See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 4706 
(Defense Contract Audit Agency); 29 U.S.C. § 209 (DOL); id. 
§ 161 (NLRB); see also Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 
408, 415 (1984) (noting that administrative subpoenas 
constitute “searches” under the Fourth Amendment).  Many 
agencies also employ personnel to physically inspect 
commercial premises for security, health, and safety violations:  
The Department of Defense scrutinizes defense contractors, 
see, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2313(a), the FDA inspects meatpackers, 
21 U.S.C. § 606(a), and the EPA surveys hazardous waste sites, 
42 U.S.C. § 6927(a).  Even examinations of employees’ 
workspaces and drug tests constitute searches under the Fourth 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616–17 (drug test); 
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (workspaces). 
Here, the significance of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50 (2013), warrants 
emphasis.  Under Millbrook, if an employee has the authority 
to perform any of these “searches”—and thus, under the 
Majority’s interpretation, qualifies as an “investigative or law 
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enforcement officer”—it matters not whether an enumerated 
intentional tort occurred during a search, seizure, or arrest.  See 
id. at 57.  The United States will be liable for any of the 
intentional torts committed by that employee at any point in 
the scope of her employment.  Id.  By my colleagues’ reading, 
that includes any employee with authority to issue an 
administrative subpoena, inspect premises, conduct an audit, 
or administer a drug test. 
The potential scale of that liability is why Congress 
sought to limit the proviso to “investigative or law enforcement 
officers” and the specific subset of intentional torts they are 
carefully trained to avoid.  Law enforcement officers “are 
expected to ‘schoo[l] themselves in the niceties’” of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, applying some practical limit to the 
proviso’s waiver of immunity.  O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 724 
(alteration in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 343 (1985)); see, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(b)–(c) (DHS).  But 
“no such expectation is generally applicable to public 
employers, at least when the search is not used to gather 
evidence of a criminal offense.”16  Id. 
                                              
16 TSA screeners are a case in point.  While undoubtedly 
performing an important job in furtherance of our nation’s 
security, screeners neither are law enforcement officers nor are 
“trained on issues of probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and 
other constitutional doctrines that govern law enforcement 
officers.”  Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 208 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  TSA law enforcement officers must complete 
standard law enforcement training prescribed by the state, 
including training in the use of firearms and in “treatment of 
persons subject to inspection, detention, search, arrest, and 
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In short, instead of drawing the principled and 
constitutionally grounded line between investigatory and 
administrative searches, my colleagues today open the United 
States Treasury to liability for the intentional torts of every 
federal employee with the authority to conduct any Fourth 
Amendment search—regardless of the employee’s knowledge 
of, or training in, Fourth Amendment doctrine.  In my view, 
Congress chose its words in the proviso carefully to avoid this 
very result. 
IV. The Majority Creates, and Takes the Wrong Side 
of, a Circuit Split 
If, as the Majority claims, its reading reflected an 
intuitive reading of the law enforcement proviso, presumably 
it would find some support in our precedent or that of other 
circuits.  But instead it marks a dramatic departure. 
Among our precedents, the Majority’s approach is in 
sharp tension with Matsko v. United States, 372 F.3d 556 (3d 
Cir. 2004), where we held that a Mine Safety and Health 
Administration employee with “authority to inspect mines and 
investigate possible violations” was not covered by the 
proviso, because “employees of administrative agencies, no 
matter what investigative conduct they are involved in, do not 
                                              
other aviation security activities.”  49 C.F.R. § 1542.217(c).  
Screeners, by contrast, must “possess a high school diploma” 
or “sufficient[ly]” relevant experience and have “basic 
aptitudes and physical abilities, including color perception, 
visual and aural acuity, physical coordination, and motor 
skills” as well as “sufficient dexterity and capability” to 
“perform pat-downs or hand-held metal detector searches.”  Id. 
§ 44935(f). 
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come within the § 2680(h) exception.”  Id. at 560.  Without 
explaining how it distinguishes TSA screeners from such 
inspectors, the Majority leaves Matsko in limbo, purporting to 
leave its holding intact while declaring its rationale “no longer 
valid.”  Maj. Op. 21.  Of course, the en banc court may jettison 
our precedent, but a survey of other circuits’ precedent reveals 
that Matsko is no outlier. 
A unanimous panel of the Eleventh Circuit squarely 
rejected the Majority’s interpretation in a persuasive and well-
reasoned, albeit non-precedential,17 opinion.  See Corbett v. 
TSA, 568 F. App’x 690 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).  The 
court there considered the pertinent statutory language and 
concluded that TSA screeners are not covered by the proviso 
for the “simple[]” reason that they are “employees,” not 
“officers.”  Id. at 701.  The court therefore relied on the same 
textual distinction that the Majority in this case elides.18 
                                              
17 Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit, while 
not binding on that court, “may be cited as persuasive 
authority.”  11th Cir. R. 36-2. 
 
18 Most district courts have reached the same conclusion 
as Corbett.  Compare, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 34 F. 
Supp. 3d 1168, 1182 (D. Colo. 2014) (holding that the proviso 
does not cover TSA screeners), Weinraub v. United States, 927 
F. Supp. 2d 258, 266 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (same), and Coulter v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 07-4894, 2008 WL 4416454, 
at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2008) (same), with Armato v. Doe 1, No. 
CV-11-02462-PHX-ROS, 2012 WL 13027047, at *4 (D. Ariz. 
May 15, 2012) (holding that the proviso covers TSA 
screeners). 
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Along those same lines, other Courts of Appeals have 
consistently treated only those performing traditional law 
enforcement duties as “investigative or law enforcement 
officers” under the proviso.  For example, the D.C. Circuit has 
concluded that postal inspectors, who are empowered to 
investigate criminal matters, see 18 U.S.C. § 3061, are covered 
by the proviso.  See Moore v. United States, 213 F.3d 705, 708–
10 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  Courts have also ruled that the proviso 
covers customs officers, see Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 
996, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2000), Veterans’ Administration (VA) 
police officers, see Celestine v. United States, 841 F.2d 851, 
852–53 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam), U.S. Marshals, see 
Hoston v. Silbert, 681 F.2d 876, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per 
curiam), ICE agents, see Caban, 671 F.2d at 1234, FBI agents, 
see Brown v. United States, 653 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. Unit A 
1981), and federal correctional officers, see Hernandez v. 
Lattimore, 612 F.2d 61, 64 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979).  Each of those 
positions participates in traditional law enforcement.19 
Consistent with these decisions, the Seventh Circuit 
held in Bunch v. United States, 880 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2018), 
that the limited record “d[id] not foreclose the possibility” that 
the proviso could apply to an ATF forensic chemist whose 
duties may have included “the identification of relevant 
                                              
19 While ICE agents have some civil responsibilities, 
they are also empowered “to make arrests for felonies which 
have been committed and which are cognizable under any law 
of the United States regulating the admission, exclusion, 
expulsion, or removal of aliens.”  8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(4).  
Likewise, Bureau of Prisons officers are entitled to carry 
firearms and make arrests for violations of federal law, see 18 
U.S.C. § 3050, as are customs officers, see 19 U.S.C. § 1589a. 
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evidence for colleagues during crime-scene investigations.”  
Id. at 943, 945 (emphasis added).  To be sure, Bunch held that 
“executing searches” under the proviso was not limited to 
executing search warrants.  Id. at 945.  But the Seventh Circuit 
emphasized that the forensic chemist may have had the 
authority under Title 18, the federal criminal code, “to inspect 
the site of any accident, or fire, in which there is reason to 
believe that explosive materials were involved,” id. at 943 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 846 (1994)), and offered, as other 
examples of the types of searches covered by the proviso, 
searches incident to arrest, protective sweeps, and searches 
conducted pursuant to the automobile exception, id. at 945—
all of which are executed by traditional law enforcement 
officers. 
On the other hand, other circuits have held that the 
proviso does not cover positions that lack a criminal law 
component.  In EEOC v. First National Bank of Jackson, for 
example, the Fifth Circuit concluded that EEOC agents fell 
outside the proviso, distinguishing between federal employees 
who “have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the 
right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or 
proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment 
practices,” and “investigative or law enforcement officers” 
who have the power to “execute searches.”  614 F.2d 1004, 
1007–08 (5th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted);  see also Wilson v. 
United States, 959 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) 
(parole officers); Moore, 213 F.3d at 710 (federal prosecutors); 
Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(per curiam) (security guards); Johnson v. United States, 547 
F.2d 688, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (VA hospital 
physicians). 
In short, with no exception until today, the Courts of 
 40 
 
Appeals have consistently interpreted the proviso to 
distinguish between federal officers involved in traditional law 
enforcement and federal employees who are not.  We should 
not be creating this circuit split, much less putting ourselves on 
the wrong side of it.   
V. Where, as Here, At Least Two Plausible 
Interpretations Exist, We Must Construe the 
Law Enforcement Proviso in Favor of the 
Sovereign 
By departing from precedent to expose the United 
States to enormous liability, the Majority’s interpretation runs 
afoul of another principle of statutory interpretation: that 
waivers of sovereign immunity must be construed narrowly in 
favor of the United States. 
Because courts do not casually infer that the United 
States has waived its sovereign immunity, a waiver must be 
“strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the 
sovereign.”  Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).  Thus, 
where “a plausible interpretation of the statute” exists that 
would preserve the United States’s sovereign immunity, a 
court must adopt it.  Cooper, 566 U.S. at 290–91.  Our Circuit, 
just like every other, has applied these principles to the FTCA’s 
waiver of immunity.  Lightfoot v. United States, 564 F.3d 625, 
628 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 
375, 380 (1st Cir. 2017); Tsolmon v. United States, 841 F.3d 
378, 382 (5th Cir. 2016); McGowan v. United States, 825 F.3d 
118, 126 (2d Cir. 2016); Lopez v. United States, 823 F.3d 970, 
976 (10th Cir. 2016); Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 
717 (6th Cir. 2014). 
While Dolan held that the general rule does not adhere 
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when interpreting an exception to the FTCA, i.e., when the 
United States reclaims its sovereign immunity,20 see 546 U.S. 
at 491–92, we consider here an exception to an exception.  
Having restored the baseline of sovereign immunity for 
intentional torts, Congress carved out an exception in the 
proviso—that is, a waiver once more.  And faced with a waiver 
of sovereign immunity, we must revert to the general rule of 
strict construction applicable to waivers of immunity.  See 
Foster v. United States, 522 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(applying this analysis).  Under that rule, the Majority cannot 
seriously argue that the original Pellegrino panel majority, the 
four dissenters here, and the unanimous panel in Corbett—not 
to mention the unanimous panel in Matsko—all adopted an 
“implausible” view of the law enforcement proviso.  Nor 
would I suggest as much of my colleagues in the Majority.  But 
there’s the rub:  A “waiver of sovereign immunity must extend 
unambiguously,” Lane, 518 U.S. at 192, such that no 
“plausible interpretation of the statute” exists under which the 
United States would remain immune from suit, Cooper, 566 
U.S. at 290–91.  Our reasonable disagreement makes one thing 
clear:  There is ambiguity in the scope of the proviso.  In these 
circumstances, we may not impute to Congress so significant a 
waiver of sovereign immunity. 
* * * 
Like my colleagues, I am sympathetic to the concern 
that the current legal regime provides no obvious remedy for 
                                              
20 Even then, Dolan tasked us with “identify[ing] those 
circumstances which are within the words and reason of the 
exception—no less and no more,” 546 U.S. at 492 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)—not with interpreting 
the exception against the sovereign. 
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torts committed by TSA screeners.  For most, TSA screenings 
are an unavoidable feature of flying, see 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a), 
and, like all government functions, screenings carry a risk of 
abuse.  For these reasons, Congress may well see fit to expand 
the law enforcement proviso or otherwise provide recourse for 
passengers seeking to assert intentional tort claims against 
screeners. 
But courts “do not sit as councils of revision, 
empowered to rewrite legislation in accord with their own 
conceptions of prudent public policy.”  United States v. 
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979).  Congress to date has 
limited the proviso to “investigative or law enforcement 
officers”—a term that covers only officers with traditional 
police powers.  The wisdom of this policy, especially as it 
implicates the public fisc, lies beyond our purview.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
